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LABOR LAW AS THE LAW OF ECONOMIC
SUBORDINATION AND RESISTANCE: A
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Harry Arthurst
INTRODUCTION
Labor law has always suffered from a degree of definitional ambiguity
as well as conceptual and normative incoherence that has detracted from its
development and efficacy. But now labor law faces a more significant-an
existential-crisis: a future without "labor." In order to assess this crisis, I
invite readers to engage in a thought experiment, to consider what
historians call a "counterfactual." Imagine that labor law had never been
invented, or having been invented, that it had become one aspect of a
broader field of legal learning and practice entitled "the law of economic
subordination and resistance" that addressed not only relations of
employment but all economic relations characterized by comparable
asymmetries of wealth and power. After retrieving some fleeting historical
glimpses of this "counterfactual," this Article concludes by assessing its
attractions as a possible way forward for labor law.
1. THE TROUBLED PAST AND TENUOUS PROSPECTS OF
LABOR LAW
Labor law has never had a precise meaning. On the one hand, it might
be broadly defined as the norms, processes, and institutions by which the
state regulates or mediates relations between employers and employed.
Such a definition would extend the reach of labor law to include many legal
regimes-taxation, intellectual property, international trade, and social
insurance-that shape labor markets and, therefore, power relations and
legal relations in the workplace. It would, however, exclude important
t University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University, Toronto. Provocation
for this thought experiment comes from two very different sources: Christopher Tomlins, Subordination,
Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 INT'L LAB. WORKING-CLASS HIST. 56 (1995), and Alan
Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW (Guy Davidov & Brian
Langille eds., 2006). I am most grateful to Kristaq Lala for his excellent research assistance.
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aspects of labor law which do not originate with the state. On the other
hand, labor law might mean whatever subject matter is conventionally
taught in law school courses, written about by legal scholars, or practiced
by lawyers who identify themselves as specialists in the field. This second
definition would doubtlessly include some matters encompassed by the
first, but would exclude others. Moreover, definitions of "labor law" are
likely to vary amongst countries, legal cultures, and historical eras. It is
impossible, however, to think of a definition of labor law that is not
centrally concerned with relations between workers and employers.
Workplace relations and labor market regulation long antedate the
identification of an academic, professional, or legislative field known as
"labor law." Industrial disputes, trade union affairs, employment contracts,
workplace safety, compensation for injuries, and maximum hours of work
had all become subjects of legislation, judicial pronouncements, and legal
texts by the end of the nineteenth century.' These subjects, however, were
not perceived to constitute a discrete field of professional or academic
concern until much later. Courses in labor law were offered in several
continental countries in the early decades of the twentieth century,2 and in
English-speaking countries at about the same time or slightly later,
sometimes under the title "labor law" (Harvard and Wisconsin 1922-
1923),3 sometimes "industrial law" (LSE 1903),4 or "master and servant
law" (Dalhousie 1915).5 Labor law, however, effectively emerged as a full-
blown academic discipline in the English-speaking world only in the years
leading up to and following the Second World War,6 while "labor law" was
recognized by legal taxonomers as a distinct branch of legal knowledge
only in the 1950s and 1960s. 7
1. Amongst the earliest English language legal texts are JAMES EDWARD DAVIS, THE LABOUR
LAWS (1875); SIR WILLIAM ERLE, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS (1869); THOMAS S. COGLEY,
THE LAW OF STRIKES, LOCKOUTS, AND LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS (1894); FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON,
HANDBOOK TO THE LABOUR LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1896).
2. Rolf Birk, Labour Law Scholarship in France, Germany and Italy, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 679 (2002); Matthew Finkin, Comparative Labour Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW (Matthias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); Matthew Finkin, The Death and
Transfiguration of Labor Law, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 171 (2011).
3. Regarding Harvard, see Matthew W. Finkin, The Marginalization of Academic Labor Law: A
Footnote to Estlund and Summers, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 811, 815 (2002). Regarding
Wisconsin, see UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL, 1922 PROF. WILLIAM RICE OFFERS ONE OF
THE FIRST LABOR LAW COURSES IN THE COUNTRY, http://law.wisc.edu/about/lorelevents.html (last
updated Sept. 21 2012).
4. See Neil Duxbury, Lord Wright and Innovative Traditionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 270
(2009).
5. JOHN WILLIS, A HISTORY OF DALHOUSIE LAW SCHOOL 79-80 (1979).
6. For references to the origins of academic labor law in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and several European countries, see Symposium: National Style in Labor Law and Social
Science Scholarship, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 639 (2002).
7. "Labor law" first appears as a subject in the following encyclopedias in the years indicated:
AMERICAN DIGEST, Labor Relations (1957); CANADIAN ABRIDGEMENT, Labour Law (1957);
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But then, as academic labor law appeared to flourish, its scope began
to change. First, "labor law" came to be understood (especially in North
America) as the law governing collective labor relations, while
"employment law" addressed the employment relations of individual,
nonunionized workers. Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, employment and
labor law began to dissolve into new subspecialties, such as discrimination
law, pension law, and occupational health and safety law which emerged as
separate domains of teaching, scholarship, and practice. By contrast, rather
than dissolving into a number of distinct subspecialties, continental
European labor law has generally remained part of a broader array of work-
related policy concerns. Leading scholars have taken labor law "beyond
employment,"' labor law has been embedded in the EU's constitution,9 and
it is increasingly subsumed into or overshadowed by "social law," the law
of the welfare state.10 This may explain why-relative to Canada, the
United States, and the United Kingdom-it continues to flourish in most
continental countries as both an intellectual project and as a focus of
political action and public policy.
Conceivably, too, the changing meaning and diminished domain of
labor law in the English-speaking world might be attributable to its
doctrinal, normative and political incoherence. As Table 1 suggests, labor
law in the broadest sense is drawn from a wide range of legal sources
which, in turn, implicate and give effect to very different values and
assumptions about social and economic relations and about what legal-
institutional arrangements ought to shape those relations.
CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST, Labour Law (1955); HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Trade
and Labour (1962). Earlier editions of several of these important law-finding resources contained
entries on the subject Trade Unions.
8. ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR
LAW IN EUROPE (2001).
9. ROGER BLANPAIN, EUROPEAN LABOUR LAW 141-60 (12th ed. 2010).
10. Mauro Zamboni, The "Social" in Social Law: An Analysis ofa Concept in Disguise, 9 J.L.
Soc'Y 63 (2008).
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Table 1: The Sources of Labor Law Broadly Defined
SOURCES OF LAW LABOR LAW APPLICATION
Special Labor Laws
Collective labor legislation Relations among unions, employers, and
workers
Employment standards legislation Floor of rights/negotiation over floor
Occupational health and safety/ Reduces industrial accidents/illnesses;
workers' compensation legislation provides compensation
Social legislation Unemployment/illness/retirement/
training
Fundamental Law
Human rights legislation Discrimination/harassment
Constitution/Charter of Rights and Regulatory jurisdiction/equality/mobility/
Freedoms access to collective bargaining/strikes and
picketing
General Law
Criminal law Picketing
Tort law Picketing/strikes/boycotts/workplace
inury
Contract law Employment contract/internal union
affairs
Property law Picketing/union solicitation
Trust law Pension/benefit funds
Administrative law Judicial review of labor tribunals
Specific Statutory Regimes
Competition law Employer associations
Corporate law Employee voice/management
responsibilities
Intellectual property law Noncompetition/ownership of inventions
Immigration law Migratory workers
Taxation law Self-employment
Trade law Goods excluded if child/convict labor
International Law
UN charters of human/social rights Freedom of association/equality
ILO conventions Directly bind/influence interpretation of
domestic labor law
NAALC/EU Social chapter Labor dimension of economic integration
Nonstate Law
Transnational law Codes of conduct
Government procurement policies Minimum standards/employment equity
Custom/usage Quotidian rules of workplace
Or perhaps labor law's failure to achieve a comprehensive and
coherent system of labor market and workplace regulation (at least in North
America) had less to do with its many conceptual and normative
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contradictions and more to do with a series of awkward social and political
facts. Forms of employment relations are proliferating and tending toward
precarity"; the proportion of workers covered by some form of collective
bargaining is rapidly shrinking, and industrial conflict is becoming
increasingly rare1 2; the corporatist political economy that produced the
Wagner Act and the so-called Fordist compromise of the post-war era has
all but disappeared 3; state regulation of labor markets (and other markets)
is viewed with increasing suspicion and has been made more difficult to
achieve by the advent of globalizationl 4; and state support for the social
safety net has been attacked-even in Europe-as too costly to sustain. 5
Contrariwise, the continuing salience and relative coherence of labor law in
the coordinated market economies of Europe may be a reflection of
political, social, and historical influences in those countries.
Finally, and most significantly, labor law may be facing an existential
crisis brought on by the diminished salience of "labor." 6 For many of its
architects and practitioners, the project of labor law was not just to better
integrate diverse legal concepts or to achieve greater coherence in
regulatory policies and practices. It was rather an attempt to repudiate the
values and assumptions embedded in those concepts and to modify or
transform the outcomes achieved by previous regulatory regimes. It was
therefore, inevitably, an attempt to protect the rights, advance the interests,
and regulate the conduct of "labor," of "workers" who were assigned that
collective identifier as members of a class or movement, as bearers of a
shared cultural identity, or as a factor of production.' 7 But however
described, whether in the language of political economy or sociology or
scientific management, the terms "labor" and "worker" are being emptied
of meaning. As Table 2 suggests, the way in which workers' subjectively
perceive themselves no longer resembles either the objective reality of their
11. Guy STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 26-58 (2011); KATHERINE
STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-
116(2004).
12. Lucio Baccaro & Chris Howell, A Common Neoliberal Trajectory: The Transformation of
Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism, 39 POL. SOC'Y 521 (2011).
13. Michael L. Wachter, Labour Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 581 (2007).
14. See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW (John Craig & Michael Lynk
eds., 2006); LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002).
15. Christoph Hermann, Neoliberalism in the European Union, 79 STUD. POL. ECON. 61 (2007).
16. 1 have developed this argument more fully elsewhere. See Harry Arthurs, What Immortal
Hand or Eye?- Who Will Redraw the Boundaries ofLabour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF
LABOUR LAW, supra note t, at 373 and Harry Arthurs, Labour Law After Labour, in THE IDEA OF
LABOUR LAW 13 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011).
17. For a recent eloquent expression of this view, see, e.g., Manfred Weiss, Re-Inventing Labour
Law?, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 16, at 43; Richard Mitchell, Where Are We Going in
Labour Law? Some Thoughts on a Field of Scholarship and Policy in Progress of Change (Mar. 15,
2010), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1615196.
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situation or the paradigm of the employment relation that is embedded in all
systems of labor law.
Table 2: What Makes Labor Labor?
"Objective" Reality/Labor "Subjective"
Law Paradigm Perception of Workers
Primary economic Producer Consumer
identity
Socio-cultural nexus Class/occupation Education/lifestyle
Political determinant Union membership/labor- Gender/race/religion/
left party affiliation region/generation
Relation to employer Subordination Autonomy
To amplify: "labor" as a way of describing a social class and its
cultural practices, a political and industrial movement, a distinct domain of
public policy, and of legal theory and practice is disappearing from
everyday usage. This is not because workers no longer need whatever
power or protection labor law gave them. They do need it, and arguably
more than ever. Workers in most advanced countries are receiving a
shrinking share of GDP"; their individual and collective bargaining power
vis-A-vis employers has declined sharply; they face declining prospects of
finding a job, retaining it for much of their working lives, or earning
generous wages and decent benefits. Worse yet: the social safety net on
which they depend during crises in their employment history has become
increasingly inadequate. One might expect that workers would react to
these developments by mobilizing aggressively to defend their interests; but
the contrary seems to be the case. Trade unions are losing members and
power, and parties of the left are generally losing their working-class
voters. 19
The explanation, I suggest, is that "labor" is no longer perceived as a
movement, a class, or a significant domain of public policy-though civil
servants, managers, and economists continue to acknowledge the
importance of "human resources." Nor are politicians and the news media
18. See OECD, Tackling Inequality: Growing Income Inequality in OECD Countries-What
Drives It and How Can Policy Tackle It? (May 2, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
32/20/47723414.pdf.
19. Explanations vary widely. See, e.g., DICK HOUTMAN, PETER ACHTERBERG & ANTON DERKS,
FAREWELL TO THE LEFTIST WORKING CLASS 15-35, 55-70 (2008); Jonas Pontusson & David Rueda,
The Politics of Inequality: Voter Mobilization and Left Parties in Advanced Industrial States, 43 COMP.
POL. STUD. 675 (2010); Jeroen van der Waal, Peter Achterberg & Dick Hautman, Class Is Not Dead-It
Has Been Buried Alive: Class Voting and Cultural Voting in Postwar Western Societies (1956-1990),
35 POL. & Soc'Y 403 (2007). For a more skeptical view, see Carlo Barone, Mario Lucchini & Simone
Sarti, Class and Political Preferences in Europe: A Multilevel Analysis of Trends over Time, 23 EUR.
Soc. REV. 373 (2007).
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much concerned with the plight of "workers," though they bemoan the
decline of the "middle class" and exploit fears of a growing underclass.
Nor do many large corporate law firms any longer view labor law as a
service worth providing to their clients. Most importantly, workers no
longer see themselves as "workers"-as a class or collectivity whose
members share common experiences, confront a common adversary and
perceive concerted action as the way to advance their shared interests. Nor
are labor's identity and solidarity still acknowledged by the media (virtually
no newspapers or television networks have "labor" reporters) or reinforced
by traditional signifiers (the cloth cap, the lunch bucket, the working class
bar or pub, the Labor Day parade have all but disappeared). Workers now
seem to prefer alternative identities: as consumers and investors rather than
as producers; as members of families, communities or affinity groups based
on religion, sport or sexual preference rather than of unions and labor-
friendly political parties; as candidates for, or core members of, the "middle
class" rather than as members of the "working class." Now to make the
obvious point: if workers do not perceive that they have collective
interests, if they are not committed to a collective identity and collective
action, there is not much collective labor law can do to improve their lot.
Can employment law-labor law minus its collective dimension-take
up the slack? In principle, individual workers in most developed countries
enjoy formal legal protection against wrongful dismissal, 20 harassment and
discrimination, unhealthy or unsafe working conditions, nonpayment of
wages or benefits, or wrongful withholding of vacations or pensions.
However, in practice government agencies charged with enforcing
protective labor legislation often lack staff, zeal, or remedial powers, while
ordinary civil litigation is usually too slow, expensive, and uncertain to be
much use to rank-and-file workers. Employment law, in other words, is not
the continuation of labor law by other means.21
So if "workers" and "labor" are no more, if labor law has run its
course, and if employment law offers at best an inadequate substitute, how
should we think about the legal regulation of labor markets and workplace
relations?
20. Arguably, the United States with its default doctrine of "employment at will" is the exception;
but the United States has developed a series of targeted protections for women, minorities, and the
disabled, while the once-sacrosanct legally prescribed contract of employment in many European
countries is being rewritten to reduce worker's job rights. See, e.g., Bruno Caruso, "The Employment
Contract Is Dead: Hurrah for the Labour Contract!" A European Perspective, EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION AFTER THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT: INNOVATIONS IN REGULATORY
DESIGN (Katherine Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 2013) [hereinafter INNOVATION IN REGULATORY
DESIGN]; Katherine V. W. Stone, The Instability of Labor Contracts: The Impact of Globalization and
Flexibilization on Employment Regulation, supra INNOVATION IN REGULATORY DESIGN.
21. See Harry Arthurs, Changing the Boundaries ofLabour Law: Innis Christie and the Search for
an Integrated Law ofLabour Market Regulation, 34 DALHOUSIE L.J. 1 (2011).
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II. THE LAW OF ECONOMIC SUBORDINATION
AND RESISTANCE: A COUNTERFACTUAL
The rise and fall of labor law in the twentieth century was a legal and
historical development of great significance. One way to imagine labor
law's future is therefore to consider what historians describe as a
"counterfactual"-something that did not happen but might have. Suppose
that during the interwar years-during the 1920s or 1930s-the pioneers of
labor law had decided that abuses attributable to disparities of economic
power were not unique to labor markets. Suppose that they had therefore
invented not labor law but "the law of economic subordination and
resistance"? Suppose further that they had developed a body of legal
learning and a repertoire of legal techniques that dealt comprehensively
with the regulation not just of employment relationships and labor markets,
but of all relationships and markets in which individuals are experiencing
economic subordination, resisting it through strategies of self-defense, and
seeking redress against it in various legal forums. 22 Alternatively, suppose
that having developed labor law's analytical concepts and systemic
architecture, they subsequently realized that similar concepts and systems
might be useful in protecting other constituencies of vulnerable individuals
against super-ordinate economic power.23
In Appendix A, I have developed a crude model depicting this
"counterfactual." It identifies as its potential beneficiaries not only
organized but unorganized workers; the self-employed, the precariously
employed and the unemployed; independent professionals and autonomous
workers; consumers, debtors and mortgagors; small investors and owners of
small business franchises; and farmers, tenants and welfare recipients. It
also shows how laws might (and sometimes do) protect members of these
groups from their powerful market adversaries in rather similar ways: by
guaranteeing their right to speak in a collective voice, to engage in
collective negotiations and to mobilize concerted pressure; by requiring the
super-ordinate power to treat subordinate parties in accordance with at least
minimally decent, nonderogable standards; by establishing formal or
informal procedures for resolving disputes between the super-ordinate and
subordinate parties; by providing alternative arrangements for individuals
whose circumstances are not appropriate for resolution within the new
system; and not least by legally entrenching the new regulatory architecture
22. Arguably, the cadre of lawyers that drafted the New Deal legislation did exactly that. See, e.g.,
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 191-
230 (1976); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEw DEAL LAWYERS 3-14, 226-53 (1982).
23. See LEON GREEN, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS (1940).
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while allowing for the possibility that subordinate parties can use political
leverage and moral arguments to seek improvements in that architecture.
Admittedly, my model in Appendix A suffers from significant
deficiencies. The list of potential beneficiaries-individuals experiencing
economic subordination-is almost certainly incomplete. The many forms
of self-help and legal regulation used by subordinated groups to resist or
limit subordination are only partially captured. The model does not explain
why some subordinate groups fail to develop successful legal, social, or
political strategies of resistance while others succeed or why once-
successful strategies-like collective bargaining-ultimately prove
inadequate. And, of course, I have committed the cardinal sin of
transforming the Wagner Act-the quintessential example of North
American exceptionalism 24-into a template that arguably has little salience
for workers in Italy or France, or for that matter, tenants, or small business
franchisees in Canada or the United States.
These are serious deficiencies indeed. Nonetheless, the model at least
enables us to think about our counterfactual, about an academic subject,
professional specialty, or policy discourse that-had it developed-might
have been called "the law of economic subordination and resistance."
Moreover, it allows us to focus on its most salient characteristic: the
integration of what up to now have been separate subjects, specialties, or
discourses. For both workers and otlger subordinated groups, integration
might have held-may still hold-considerable appeal.
Labor law's claim to uniqueness has always rested on some version of
the proposition that "labor is not a commodity." 25 However, this claim has
also exposed labor law to the criticism that workers were seeking unique
"privileges" to commit what in other contexts might be torts or crimes, to
the enjoyment of economic advantages not available to nonlabor groups,
such as small business owners or farmers, and to direct representation in the
political process through a class-based party. 26 But suppose that labor law
had adopted instead a different foundational proposition: "the
subordination of workers in the employment relation is but one
representative example of the experience of many groups under capitalism,
all of which should have the basic right to be protected from the arbitrary
24. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2004); Roy Adams, The Wagner-Act Model: A Toxic System Beyond Repair,
40 J. INDUS. REL. 122 (2002).
25. See, e.g., David Beatty, Labour Is Not a Commodity, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (Barry
Reiter & John Swan eds., 1980); Judy Fudge, Labour As a "Fictive Commodity": Radically
Reconceptualizing Labour Law, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 16; Paul O'Higgins, "Labour
Is Not a Commodity" An Irish Contribution to International Labour Law, 26 INDUS. L.J. 225 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Keith Syrett, "Immunity," "Privilege," and "Right": British Trade Unions and the
Language ofLabour Law Reform, 25 J.L. & SOC'Y 388 (1998).
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exercise of private economic power." This might have removed the stigma
of special pleading by labor, given other groups a stake in the success of
labor's resistance and encouraged development of a comprehensive theory
of protection and resistance that would have benefited all groups. It would
also have provided workers themselves with a continuing justification for
resistance and the law with a continuing rationale for the regulation of
workplaces and labor markets, despite the collapse of "labor" as a
significant legal, political, and sociological category.
Then, what might have been the basic content of a counterfactual "law
of economic subordination and resistance"?
To make explicit what is implicit in Appendix A, the elements of such
a law have long existed, although they are seldom collected within a
comprehensive schema designed to emphasize their normative and
functional connectedness. While the process by no means progressed in
linear fashion, by the end of the nineteenth century, legislation had been
introduced in most advanced economies to protect workers' interests,
enlarge their rights, and/or modify restrictions on their collective
activities. 27 Tenants began to enjoy security of tenure and protection
against rent gouging in most countries during the First, and especially the
Second, World War.28 Consumer protection laws go back to the nineteenth
century and beyond, and have proliferated since the 1960s.29 Farmers have
participated in purchasing and marketing cooperatives since the nineteenth
century30 and in legislatively sanctioned supply management schemes for
much of the twentieth. 31 Long-standing laws against securities fraud,
insider trading, and the oppression of minority shareholders were
introduced, updated, or strengthened following the financial crash of
1929.32 At least since the Great Depression, governments have been
enacting regulations to protect defaulting mortgagors and creditors against
forfeiture and especially against the illicit pressure tactics of lenders.33
Procedural due process for welfare recipients, whether constitutionally
27. Roy J. Adams, Regulating Unions and Collective Bargaining: A Global, Historical Analysis of
Determinants and Consequences, 14 COMP. LAB. L.J. 272 (1992).
28. JOEL F. BRENNER & HERBERT M. FRANKLIN, RENT CONTROL IN NORTH AMERICA AND FOUR
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (1977).
29. Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt I, A History of Government Regulation ofAdulteration
and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2, 34, 38 (1984).
30. LOUIS AUBREY WOOD, A HISTORY OF FARMERS' MOVEMENTS IN CANADA (1975).
31. WILLIAM E. MORRISS, CHOSEN INSTRUMENT: A HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD,
THE MCIVER YEARS (1987).
32. Bernard J. Kilbride, The British Heritage of Securities Legislation in the United States, 17 Sw.
L.J. 258 (1963); Jessica Wang, Imagining the Administrative State: Legal Pragmatism, Securities
Regulation, and New Deal Liberalism, 17 J. POL'Y HIST. 257 (2005).
33. W. T. Easterbrook, Agricultural Debt Adjustment, 2 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. Scl. 390 (1939); S.
W. Field, The Limitation of the Right ofFree Contract in Alberta, 6 U. TORONTO L.J. 86 (1945).
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guaranteed or not,34 is mandated by many welfare regimes and even
practiced by some.3 5  Self-governing professions in some countries have
had the legal right to fix prices for standard services 36; in others they have
used union-like tactics to secure favorable terms for services rendered
through state-sponsored schemes of health care or legal aid.37 Cab owners,
self-employed truck drivers and fishers have either been "deemed" to be
employees eligible for conventional collective bargaining,38 provided with a
special regulatory regime under which they may engage in collective
negotiations, 39 or (competition laws to the contrary notwithstanding) simply
allowed to act in concert to defend themselves against their "super-ordinate
other." 40
True, these experiments in the protection of subordinate groups have
been scattered across time and space. True, they have not been integrated
into a coherent body of legal theory, principles, rules, and institutions.
But-I argue-perhaps they might have been or should be.
Take the right of economically subordinate groups to protect their
interests through the use of concerted economic pressure: why not treat rent
34. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 219 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
35. JOEL HANDLER, PROTECTING THE SOCIAL SERVICE CLIENT: LEGAL AND STRUCTURAL
CONTROLS ON OFFICIAL DISCRETION (1978); Jan L. Hagen, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Another
Look at Welfare Fair Hearings, 57 SOC. SERv. REV. 177 (1983); see also Ontario Works Act, S.O.
1997, c. 25, §§ 24-36 (Can.); CENTER FOR EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT, TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE SOURCEBOOK NEW YORK c.4 § D (2012), http://otda.ny.gov/programs/temporary-
assistance/TASB.pdf.
36. Professional fee tariffs in the United States have been held to be illegal under antitrust
legislation. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). However, a number of Canadian
professions retain the right to set or suggest fees. See Timothy R. Muzondo & Bohumir Pazderka,
Occupational Licensing and Professional Incomes in Canada, 13 CAN. J. ECON. 659 (1980).
37. For recent examples of actual or potential concerted refusals to work by publicly remunerated
professionals see Adam Radwanski & Karen Howlett, McGuinty Sends Message by Forcing Lower Fees
on Ontario Doctors, GLOBE & MAIL, May 14, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/ontario-cuts-fees-to-doctors-on-some-procedures/article2424865/; Lawyers Set to Expand
Boycott of Ontario Legal Aid Cases, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 10, 2010, http://www.thestar.com/news/
ontario/article/748904-lawyers-set-to-expand-boycott-of-ontario-legal-aid-cases. See also Sujit
Choudry & Troyen A. Brennan, Collective Bargaining by Physicians-Labour Law, Antitrust Law, and
Organized Medicine, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1141 (2001).
38. Harry Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing
Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965).
39. E.g., in Nova Scotia, the Fisherman's Federation Act, N.S. c.40 (1947) (Can.) established a
special collective bargaining regime for fishermen. In 1971, the statute was repealed, and fishermen
were brought under the general legislation governing collective bargaining, Trade Union Act, N.S. c.19
§l(l)(k)(ii) (1972) (Can.), which defined "employee" to include "a person employed or engaged on
fishing vessels of all types or in the operation of these vessels." See also Fisheries Organizations
Support Act, S.N.S. c.6 (1995-1996) (Can.). In Newfoundland and Labrador, by contrast, collective
bargaining continues to be conducted under the Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.N.L.
c.F-18 (1990); Charles Steinberg, Collective Bargaining Rights in the Canadian Sea Fisheries: A Case
Study ofNova Scotia (Columbia University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1973).
40. See, e.g., Arthurs, supra note 38; Bernard D. Meltzer, Labour Unions, Collective Bargaining,
and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1965); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application ofAntitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963).
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strikes, consumer boycotts, and welfare sit-ins as the legal, as well as the
functional and moral, equivalent of industrial action by workers? Or take
strategies adopted by governments to structure countervailing power in
different parts of the economy: there are important similarities between
agricultural marketing agencies and self-governing trades and professions,
on the one hand, and the Wagner model of collective bargaining on the
other. Or take the statutory implication of terms or the regulation of prices
in order to protect the weaker party to a contractual relationship: why do we
not perceive the link between rescission clauses in consumer protection
statutes and the regulation of automobile insurance rates on the one hand,
and on the other labor standards legislation that forbids derogation from the
minimum wages and maximum working hours prescribed by statute?
Finally, recognition of a comprehensive "law of economic
subordination and resistance"-making visible and explicit the connections
between labor law and related regimes-might have had certain advantages
for labor law scholarship.
In the first place, it might have carried labor law farther along the
trajectory on which it was launched when it broke free of contract, tort, and
criminal law and began to develop its own distinctive analytical categories
and discursive conventions. Instead of relying on special pleading to the
effect that the unique character of employment relations requires, in effect,
a semi-autonomous legal subsystem,4 1 labor law might have presented itself
as part of a broad array of differentiated but related subsystems that
collectively challenged some core conceptions of the law of industrial and
postindustrial capitalism. This might arguably have given labor law a
stronger claim to legitimacy, made its claims seem less anomalous, and
enriched it with insights from adjacent domains of legal resistance. It might
have provided a more congenial home for antidiscrimination, social
welfare, employment standards and health and safety law-subjects which
have either had to accept their subordinate status as "labor law's little
sister"42 or to put on constitutional airs in order to rise above it.43
41. Mea culpa, see Harry Arthurs, Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada's
Second Century, 45 CAN. B. REv. 786 (1967); Harry Arthurs, Understanding Labour Law: The Debate
Over "Industrial Pluralism," 38 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 83 (1985); see also Lord Wedderburn,
Labour Law: From Here to Autonomy?, 16 INDUS. L.J. 1 (1987); Lord Wedderburn, Labour Law:
Autonomy from the Common Law, 9 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 219 (1988).
42. JUDY FUDGE, LABOUR LAW'S LITTLE SISTER: THE EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ACT AND THE
FEMINIZATION OF LABOUR (1991).
43. DAVID BEATTY, PUTTING THE CHARTER TO WORK: DESIGNING A CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR
CODE (1987).
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III. THE COUNTERFACTUAL IN THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF
NORTH AMERICAN LABOR LAW
To be fair, there are good reasons why a law of "economic
subordination and resistance" has not developed so far. While "economic
subordination" may be experienced by all the groups I have mentioned, it is
by no means clear that they have much else in common. They inhabit
different markets, experience different forms of subordination at the hands
of different superordinate powers, confront different prospects for
mobilizing for collective action in defense of their interests, and can
arguably be protected most effectively by different strategies of state
intervention. Moreover, it is by no means certain that attempts to develop
an integrated legal response to their plight would in fact result in greater
conceptual coherence or normative consistency than labor law presently
exhibits; indeed, the contrary is more likely. Nonetheless, while I have
described the law of economic subordination and resistance as a
"counterfactual," on several occasions both the United States and Canada
have come tantalizingly close to embedding labor law in an integrated
network of legal regimes that protect not only workers but other
economically subordinate groups.
During the Progressive era in the United States-roughly the 1880s
through the 1920s-workers, farmers, and small businesses sometimes
found common cause in opposing a particularly rapacious and notoriously
unregulated variant of capitalism. In reaction, antitrust laws and regulation
of utility rates were often advocated by the same politicians, academics, and
journalists who supported labor's demands for safer workplaces and
collective bargaining.4 4 For a variety of reasons, however, Progressive
initiatives succeeded only sporadically and at the local level.45
The most ambitious and successful attempt to align labor law with
other legal initiatives to protect a broad spectrum of economically
subordinate people occurred only at the very end of this era, during the
Great Depression. Roosevelt's National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
enacted in 1933, bore a striking resemblance to the counterfactual "law of
economic subordination and resistance." 46 It established codes of fair
competition for numerous industries, protected consumers and small
businesses from predatory practices, regulated the price of many consumer
products, and created a program of public works to provide the unemployed
44. ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE
1877-1917, at 106-08, 118-20 (1999).
45. DANIEL ROGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998).
46. National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933). For a brief summary see Milton
Handler, The National Industrial Recovery Act, 19 A.B.A. J. 440 (1933).
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with a chance to earn a living. The same legislation also guaranteed
workers minimum wages and decent working conditions, and provided
templates for the subsequent Wagner and Fair Labor Standards Acts, while
companion statutes dealt with the agricultural economy and related matters.
There are many reasons to be critical of the politics, design, and execution
of the NIRA, which was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1935 on
the grounds that it violated the division of powers between the federal and
state governments and between the executive and legislative branches.4 7
Nonetheless, the Act did attempt to comprehensively address the disparate
concerns of economically subordinate victims of a capitalist economy in
deep moral, structural, and operational crisis and as noted, many of its
features were subsequently enacted as separate statutes.
Canadian history also offers tantalizing glimpses of what might have
been. For example, the Combines Investigation Act of 1889 sought to
protect farmers, consumers, and small businesses against the same
corporations that were seen to oppress workers. 48 Both the Combines Act
and labor legislation (enacted two decades later) were administered by the
Department of Labor and its founding Deputy Minister, Mackenzie King;
and both for a time placed primary reliance on strategies of investigation,
conciliation, and the mobilization of public opinion. 49 Then, in the mid-
1930s, the so-called Bennett New Deal-emulating its American
namesake-proposed to provide public works programs and minimum
employment standards for workers; grants and supply management schemes
for farmers; and pensions, health insurance and deposit insurance for
everyone. Whether and to what extent Prime Minister Bennett, a
Conservative, actually intended to enact and implement a U.S. style "New
Deal" is very much open to question.5 0 Bennett's version of a compendious
"law of economic subordination and resistance" was partially abandoned on
the drawing boards, partially appropriated by the opposition Liberals who
defeated him shortly after he announced his New Deal program, and
partially struck down by the courts.51 However, it shows that even highly
47. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
48. The Combines Investigation Act, S.C. c.41 (1889) (Can). But see Michael Bliss, Another Anti-
Trust Tradition: Canadian Anti-Combines Policy, 1889-1910, 47 Bus. HIST. REv. 177 (1973) (arguing
that the legislation merely declared the common law and was neither intended to nor, in fact, reduced
corporate power).
49. W.L. Mackenzie King, The Canadian Combines Investigation Act, 42 ANNALS Am. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 149 (1912); V.W. Bladen, A Note on the Reports of Public Investigations into
Combines in Canada, 1888-1932, 5 CONTRIBUTIONS CAN. EcON. 61 (1932).
50. Donald Forster & Colin Read, The Politics of Opportunism: The New Deal Broadcasts, 60
CAN. HIST. REV. 324 (1979).
51. RICHARD WILBUR, THE BENNETT ADMINISTRATION 1930-1935 (1969), http://www.collection
scanada.gc.ca/obj/008004/f2/H-24_en.pdf; RICHARD WILBUR, THE BENNETT NEW DEAL: FRAUD OR
598
2013] ECONOMIC SUBORDINATION AND RESISTANCE
conservative public figures could perceive that the problems encountered by
these groups were related, arguably mutually reinforcing, and required an
integrated response. In the 1930s as well, provincial attempts to regulate
the use of economic power-sometimes cautious, sometimes ill
considered-were perceived by contemporary observers52 as closely related
if not carefully integrated reactions to the Great Depression. By way of
example, Alberta's Social Credit government adopted extensive debtor
relief statutes. Ontario's Industrial Standards Act and Qu6bec's Collective
Agreements Extension Act allowed workers and employers to establish
industry-wide standards for sectoral labor markets.53 Legislation in those
and other provinces gave farmers comparable control over particular
commodities markets. 54 Then, in the early 1940s, the federal government
used its wartime "emergency" powers to regulate labor, housing, consumer,
financial, commodities, and other markets not only to mobilize resources
required for military purposes, but to forestall the social strife that would
ensue if dominant corporations were given free reign and vulnerable groups
and individuals were left without protection.55
These counterfactual episodes often ended in disappointment. The
common law doctrine of restraint of trade, the progenitor of the Combines
Act, was frequently used to delegitimate concerted action by workers. 56
Elements of the Bennett New Deal were struck down by the courts5 7;
provincial legislation protecting debtors was disallowed58 ; supply
management survived for some time in some sectors, but now seems likely
to be swept away entirely as an impediment to free trade59; and other
PORTENT (1969); F.R. Scott, The Privy Council and Mr. Bennett's "New Deal" Legislation, 3 CAN. J.
ECON. & POL. Scl. 234 (1937).
52. These developments were closely tracked by a committee of the Canadian Bar Association,
which published an annual report with commentary throughout the 1930s. See, e.g., D. J. Thom,
Noteworthy Changes in the Statue Law, 1935, 13 CAN. B. REV. 487 (1935).
53. Industrial Standards Act, S.O., c.28 (1935) (Can.); Collective Labour Agreements Extension
Act, Q.S. c.56 (1934) (Can.).
54. See, e.g., Produce Marketing Act, B.C., c. 54, (1926-1927) (Can); Dairy Products Sales
Adjustment Act, 1929, S.B.C. c. 20 (1929) (Can.); Farm Products Control Act, R.S.O c.75 (1937)
(Can.); The Milk Control Act, R.S.O. c.76 (1937) (Can); Municipalities Relief and Agricultural Aid Act,
R.S.S., c.159 (1940) (Can.); Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, S.C., c.53 (1934) (Can.); Farm
Security Act, S.S., c.30 (1944) (Can.); An Act Respecting the Pledge of Agricultural Property, S.Q., c.69
(1940) (Can.).
55. See, e.g., JUDY FUDGE & ERIC TUCKER, LABOUR BEFORE THE LAW: REGULATION OF
WORKERS' COLLECTIVE ACTION IN CANADA 1900-1948, at 228-301 (2004); K. W. Taylor, Canadian
War-Time Price Controls, 1941-1946,13 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 81 (1947).
56. W. P. M. KENNEDY & JACOB FINKELMAN, THE RIGHT TO TRADE: AN ESSAY IN THE LAW OF
TORT (1933).
57. Scott, supra note 51.
58. JR. Mallory, Disallowance and the National Interest: The Alberta Social Credit Legislation of
1937, 14 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 342 (1948).
59. Robert D. Tamilia & Sylvain Charlebois, The Importance of Marketing Boards in Canada: A
Twenty-First Century Perspective, 109 BRIT. FOOD J. 119 (2007).
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wartime interventions in markets-e.g., rent controls-survived only in
vestigial form. 60 Finally, the same wartime regulations that conferred rights
on unions also subjected them to significant constraints, which have
become "normalized" as essential elements of our labor law.61
Nonetheless, looking back on these counterfactual developments scattered
through the first half of the twentieth century, we can see how labor law
was briefly-and might have become in the long term-embedded in a
larger and more ambitious strategy to protect vulnerable individuals from
superordinate corporate power.
Of course, no such ambitious strategy actually took hold. Ironically,
unions, in their heyday, sometimes functioned not only as advocates for
subordinated workers but also as gatekeepers, restricting the labor market
opportunities of women, immigrants, and members of visible minority
groups.62 Now that heyday is past and with it, much of the discrimination
practiced by unions. However, while some unions vigorously and
effectively represent a broad spectrum of "economically subordinate"
workers, many others that have survived represent a relatively privileged
employee elite. Unions of professional athletes have been spectacularly
successful, securing fabulous wealth for their members, gaining part-
ownership of the means of production, and, apparently, solving the problem
of regulating labor markets across national boundaries. 63 Unions in the
broader public sector-whose members hold relatively well-paying and
secure jobs-currently account for an absolute majority of all union
members.64 Union pension and benefit funds now comprise one of
Canada's largest pools of investment capital65  (although the financial
leverage they represent is seldom used to advance the interests of workers
who lack pensions and other benefits).66  Nor do labor law regimes
60. Residential Tenancies Act, S.O., c.17 (2006) (Can.); An Act Respecting the R6gie du
Logement, R.S.Q., c.R-8.1 (2010) (Can.).
61. FUDGE & TUCKER, supra note 55.
62. The conceptual basis of the argument is contested, the evidence is ambiguous, and the situation
is in flux. See, e.g., Sue Ledwith & Fiona Colgan, Tackling Gender, Diversity and Trade Union
Democracy: A Worldwide Project?, in GENDER DIVERSITY AND TRADE UNIONS: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (Fiona Colgan & Sue Ledwith eds., 2001); Jonathan S. Leonard, The Effects of Unions
on the Employment of Blacks, Hispanics, and Women, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 115 (1985); Dennis
R. Maki, Unions As "Gatekeepers" of Occupational Sex Discrimination: Canadian Evidence, 15
APPLIED ECON. 469 (1983).
63. For a history of the rise of U.S.-based players' unions see Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box
Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on
Competition, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 267.
64. David G. Blanchflower, International Patterns of Union Membership, 45 BRIT. J. INDUS.
REL. 1, 4 (2008).
65. ONTARIO EXPERT COMMISSION ON PENSIONS, A FINE BALANCE: SAFE PENSIONS/AFFORDABLE
PLANS/FAIR RULES 35 (2008).
66. Harry Arthurs & Claire Mumm6, From Governance to Political Economy: Insights from a
Study of Relations Between Corporations and Workers, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE
600
2013] ECONOMIC SUBORDINATION AND RESISTANCE
designed to protect individual unorganized "employees" necessarily reach
the most "economically subordinate" workers. To cite one example: the
Supreme Court's recent progressive decisions on wrongful dismissal are
more likely to benefit highly paid executives, managers, and professionals
than rank-and-file workers.67 Or another: male workers in relatively secure
standard jobs are much better served by the Canadian employment
insurance system than precarious workers-often women, young people,
and immigrants-and the chronically or seasonally unemployed.68 Or a
third: fewer and fewer nonunion workers are covered by generous defined
benefit pension plans,69 but such plans remain widely available to
privileged managerial and professional employees.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE COUNTERFACTUAL AS THE NARRATIVE OF
LABOR LAW'S FUTURE?
Interest in labor law's reconceptualization as part of a comprehensive
"law of economic subordination and resistance" has tended to increase
during moral or social crises or crises of political economy. Whether
today's crisis of capitalism is as extreme as the one that produced the NIRA
and the Bennett New Deal in the 1930s is a moot point. On the one hand,
the crisis has energized what Daniel Drache calls "defiant publics"-the
Indignants of Madrid and Athens, the Occupy Movement in New York, the
99% Movement in Vancouver, the Antigreed marchers in Rome.70 On the
other hand, these "defiant publics" have not yet formed a coherent
movement: they have no organization, no ideology, no program, no
strategy, no blueprint for institutional reform, and certainly no legal agenda.
Their members know that they are economically subordinate, and they want
to resist. They, however, have neither a cure for the current travails of
capitalism nor an alternative to it. I note especially that none of these
GOVERNANCE, LABOR AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 350, 365-67 (Cynthia Williams & Peer Zumbansen
eds., 2011).
67. Since 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada has decided seven wrongful dismissal cases. In only
one of these was the plaintiff a rank-and-file worker. See Honda v Keays, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362
(assembly line worker). In the other six cases, the plaintiff was in a managerial or equivalent position.
See Machtinger v HOJ Industries, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986 (credit and sales manager); Wallace v United
Grain Growers, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 (sales manager); Farber v Royal Trust, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846
(regional manager); Dowling v Halifax, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 22 (works supervisor); McKinley v BC
Telephone, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 161 (accountant/senior financial officer); Evans v Teamsters, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 661 (union business agent).
68. Leah F. Vosko, The Challenge of Expanding El Coverage: Charting Exclusions and Partial
Exclusions on the Bases of Gender, Immigration Status, Age, and Place of Residence and Exploring
Avenues for Inclusive Policy Redesign, (Mowat Centre El Task Force, 2011), http://www.mowateit
askforce.ca/sites/default/files/Vosko I.pdf.
69. Frank Eich, The Importance of Defined-Benefit Occupational Pension Schemes in Selected
OECD Countries (Pension Corporation Research, 2010), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54556.
70. DANIEL DRACHE, DEFIANT PUBLICS (2008).
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movements is calling for "a new NIRA"-a comprehensive program to deal
with widespread economic subordination. On the contrary, some of these
movements (not alln) appear quite hostile to the idea of the state and to
governments of any stripe. They might well reject a new NIRA on the
grounds that it would reinforce the political economy, the political system,
and political class that have brought the advanced economies to their
present discontents.72
Nonetheless, we should not neglect the narrative of resistance, which
is by no means "counterfactual." Here and there, usually on an ad hoc
basis, diverse groupings of subordinate people have been able to band
together to confront superordinate economic power. Examples include
product boycotts organized by consumers, students, and religious groups to
help end the exploitation of workers at home and abroad73 ; local community
organizations, racial groups, and labor unions working together to secure
job opportunities, decent working conditions, and "living wages" in U.S.
cities 74; online global networks of activists committed to revealing the
shoddy employment, consumer, and environmental practices of large
corporations75 ; demonstrations that have brought down governments 76; and,
forced international financial institutions to recalibrate their policies.77
Perhaps out of these intermittent struggles and occasional victories, a new
vision of labor law will ultimately emerge-a more ambitious vision that
transcends the traditional boundaries of labor law and draws on "economic
subordination and resistance" as its unifying theme. We must hope so.
Without a new and plausible expression of how the law can and should
71. For a minority view see THE ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE, http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org (last
visited Mar. 12, 2013). The Institute is dedicated to "carrying forward the legacy and value of Franklin
and Eleanor Roosevelt," and it supports the Occupy movement but sponsors research into and discussion
of the "Next New Deal." Id.
72. See, e.g., Marina Sitrin, Horizontalism and the Occupy Movements, 59 DISSENT 74 (2012);
Heather Gautney, What Is Occupy Wall Street? The History of Leaderless Movements, WASH. POST
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/nationallon-leadership/what-is-occupy-wall-street-the-
history-of-leaderless-movements/201 1/l0/10/glQAwkFjaL story.html.
73. See, e.g., Dana Frank, Where Are the Workers in Consumer-Worker Alliances? Class
Dynamics and the History of Consumer-Labor Campaigns, 31 POL. & Soc'Y 262 (2003); Andrew Ross,
The Quandaries of Consumer Based Labor Activism-A Low-Wage Case Study, 22 CULTURAL STUD.
770 (2008).
74. See, e.g., Bruce Nissen, The Effectiveness and Limits of Labor-Community Coalitions:
Evidence from South Florida, 29 LAB. STUD. J. 67 (2004); Katherine Stone & Scott Cummings, Labor
Activism in Local Politics: From CBAs to "CBAs," in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 16.
75. DRACHE, supra note 70.
76. Since the onset of the Great Recession, Conservative governments have fallen in Denmark,
Ireland, Italy, and France, and labor or socialist governments have fallen in Spain, the United Kingdom,
and Greece.
77. See, e.g., Hamid Hosseini, The Most Recent Crisis of Capitalism: To What Extent Will It
Impact the Globalization of Recent Decades, 12 J. APPLIED BUS. & ECON. 69 (2011); Bryan C.
Mercurio, Reflections on the World Trade Organization and the Prospects for Its Future, 10 MELB. J.
INT'L L. 49 (2009); Daniel Drezner, Macro First: Policy Coordination After the Great Recession,
(Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1497512 (2009).
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ensure fairness and decency in economic relations, we may one day come to
regard subordination as merely "the way things always have been" and to
relegate all forms of resistance to the realm of the "counterfactual."
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